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Abstract 
Objective: The main objective of this study was to assess the diagnostic performances of an 
alert system integrated into the CPOE/EMR system for renally cleared drug dosing control. The 
generated alerts were compared with the daily routine practice of pharmacists as part of the 
analysis of medication orders. Materials and Methods: The pharmacists performed their 
analysis of medication orders as usual and were not aware of the alert system interventions 
that were not displayed for the purpose of the study neither to the physician nor to the 
pharmacist but kept with associate recommendations in a log file. A senior pharmacist 
analyzed the results of medication order analysis with and without the alert system. The unit 
of analysis was the drug prescription line. The primary study endpoints were the detection of 
drug dose prescription errors and inter-rater reliability between the alert system and the 
pharmacists in the detection of drug dose error. Results: The alert system fired alerts in 8.41% 
(421/5006) of cases: 5.65% (283/5006) “exceeds max daily dose” alerts and 2.76% (138/5006) 
“under-dose” alerts. The alert system and the pharmacists showed a relatively poor 
concordance: 0.106 (CI 95% [0.068 – 0.144]). According to the senior pharmacist review, the 
alert system fired more appropriate alerts than pharmacists, and made fewer errors than 
pharmacists in analyzing drug dose prescriptions: 143 for the alert system and 261 for the 
pharmacists. Unlike the alert system, most diagnostic errors made by the pharmacists were 
‘false negatives’. The pharmacists were not able to analyze a significant number (2097; 
25.42%) of drug prescription lines because understaffing. Conclusion: This study strongly 
suggests that an alert system would be complementary to the pharmacists’ activity and 
contribute to drug prescription safety.   
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1. Introduction  
Clinical decision support systems (CDSS) have already proven their efficacy in preventing 
medication errors related to prescribing (1)(2). However, studies evaluating computerized 
physician order entry systems (CPOE) and CDSS have also reported a reluctance of physicians 
to use computerized tools. Pharmacists may be more willing to use computerized tools than 
physicians (3). Physicians frequently ignore justified CDSS medication alerts whereas 
pharmacists help physicians handle these alerts correctly (4). Pharmacists are also effective at 
preventing adverse drug events (5)(6) and reducing costs associated with drug therapies (7). 
In France, pharmaceutical analysis of medication orders has been mandatory since 1991 in 
hospitals (8). Pharmacists check physicians’ medication orders for each patient to detect 
possible errors. The daily analysis of all the orders makes up a large proportion of the workload 
of pharmacists. The medication orders associated most commonly with errors are those for 
cases involving decline in renal or hepatic function requiring modifications of drug therapy (9).  
A CDSS adapted to this activity could potentially improve the safety of medication 
prescriptions at a reasonable cost without imposing an unacceptable workload on pharmacists. 
We designed and implemented a clinical decision rule–based alert system for drug dose 
verification integrated into the CPOE system of the Hôpital Européen Georges Pompidou 
(HEGP) (10)(11). The alert system was designed to check medication orders and, if necessary, 
display recommendations to adjust medication doses for patients suffering from impaired 
renal function. The main objective of this study was to assess the diagnostic performances of 
the alert system compared with the routine daily practice of pharmacists concerning the 
pharmaceutical analysis of medication orders. 
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2. Methods 
2.1 Study site and settings 
HEGP is a teaching hospital with 24 clinical departments and 795 beds. The HEGP clinical 
information system integrates an electronic health record (EHR) with a CPOE (DxCare®, 
MEDASYS) (12). In DxCare®, each medication order includes one or several ‘prescription lines’. 
Each prescription line corresponds to one prescribed drug. 
At HEGP, the pharmaceutical analysis of medication orders is part of the daily practice for 
medication orders in nine clinical departments containing 227 beds: nephrology (19 beds), 
vascular medicine (23 beds), clinical immunology (19 beds), cardiovascular surgery (52 beds), 
geriatric health service (27 beds), orthopedics (17 beds), cardiology (29 beds), hypertension 
(16 beds) and internal medicine (25 beds). The mean time of hospital stay in these 
departments is 6 days (range 3 to 11 days). The mean number of medication orders is nine per 
day per patient. The team of pharmacists responsible for the daily pharmaceutical analysis of 
medication orders is composed of six pharmacists (three seniors and three residents). Every 
day, each pharmacist accompanies physicians on their rounds and analyses medication 
prescription orders from one or two clinical departments. Each medication order is checked, 
drug line by drug line (dose, unit, time of administration, route of administration, frequency 
per day, reconstitution process, and compatibility) against biological markers and patient 
records. 
Although pharmaceutical analysis of medication orders has been mandatory in hospitals in 
France since 1991 (8), there are insufficient pharmacists for this task so not all physicians’ 
medication orders are validated. 
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This study was conducted over a period of 7 months between March 2011 and September 
2011. All patients admitted in one of the nine departments with pharmaceutical analysis 
activities and prescribed one or more medications targeted by the alert system (Table I) were 
included in this study. 
2.3 Clinical alert system design  
Using the Summary of Product Characteristics, the recommendations of the “drug prescribing 
in renal failure: dosing guidelines for adults and children” (13) and the French Guidelines for 
Prescription in Renal Disease (GPR) handbook (14), an expert panel, including nephrologists 
and pharmacists, determined the dose adjustments according to the estimated glomerular 
filtration rate (eGFR) for 24 drugs (Table I). The eGFR was estimated using the revised-4- 
component version of the Modification of Diet in Renal Disease (MDRD) study equation; 
however, the race component was not taken into account because it has not been validated in 
the European context. Required dosing adjustments were based on degree of kidney function 
impairment, classified into different categories according to the medication. For example, for 
Allopurinol, four categories were defined: eGFR (< 15 mL/min/1.73 m2), eGFR (between 15 to 
30 mL/min/1.73 m2), eGFR (between 30 to 59 mL/min/1.73 m2) and eGFR (> 59 mL/min/1.73 
m2). The expert panel determined the dose range and frequency of administration for each of 
the medications in each of these categories and described them in a set of recommendation 
tables (15).   
Using a clinical decision rule design framework called BRDF, described in (11), we established 
962 clinical decision rules (Table V) to fire “exceeds max daily dose” alerts and “under-dose” 
alerts according to the recommendation tables (15). We implemented these rules as an alert 
system using a Business Rule Management System (BRMS) from IBM® which allows the 
pharmacists to be included in the implementation step through the ‘user friendly’ interface 
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called Rule Team Server (RTS). To refine the decision rules implemented and before the 
integration of the alert system into the CIS, several iterations of a retrospective validation step 
were run using a clinical data warehouse (CDW). This design step is described in  (15). Finally 
we integrated the alert system to the CPOE/EMR system of the HEGP. 
2.4 Study design 
The pharmacists’ daily analysis of the medication orders 
A study at the HEGP to assess the individual variation between pharmacists analysis of 
physicians’ medication orders revealed substantial disparity between pharmacists (manuscript 
in preparation). Thus, it was important to standardize the pharmaceutical analysis activities 
between the pharmacists to facilitate comparisons with the alert system analysis. We 
therefore organized several training sessions for the pharmacists to be familiar with the 
recommendation tables described previously.  
During the study period, the pharmacists performed the analysis of the medication orders as 
usual; if a drug prescription line contains an error, they report it using the CPOE interface 
dedicated to the pharmacists. Otherwise, the pharmacist tags the drug prescription line as 
'accepted'. For the purpose of this prospective study the alerts and recommendations targeted 
to the physicians and/or pharmacists were not displayed in the CPOE interface but stored in a 
log file to be compared later with the pharmacists’ analysis of medication orders. The panel of 
pharmacists was therefore not aware of the alert system analysis of the medication orders.    
The alert system analysis of the medication orders 
During the study period, the alert system automatically checked drug doses in medication 
orders including one or several drugs listed in Table I and fired an alert with a recommendation 
if necessary. Otherwise, the alert system tagged the drug prescription line as ‘accepted’. Each 
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week, the alert system stored all the results in a CSV log file. Each line of the log file 
corresponds to a CPOE-drug prescription line and includes the following data: Patient 
identifier, encounter number, patient first and last name, patient date of birth, patient sex, 
hospitalization department, medication, dose regimen, prescription start and end date, patient 
eGFR, pharmacist recommendation and alert system recommendation, and rule ID.  
Impact on clinical decision rules 
During the study period, each alert fired by the alert system was tagged with a rule ID. 
Consequently, each drug prescription line reviewed by the senior pharmacist and liable to an 
alert was also related to a rule ID. We used this relation to assess the utility of this study for 
the rule refinement and to make some improvements. 
Statistical analysis 
The unit of analysis was the drug prescription line; all the drug prescription lines analyzed both 
by the alert system and the pharmacists were studied. The primary study endpoints were the 
detection of drug dose prescription errors and the inter-rater reliability between detection of 
drug dose errors by the alert system and by the pharmacists. A drug prescription line is 
considered erroneous if the drug dose is higher (max daily dose error) or lower (under dose 
error) than the drug dose recommended by the expert panel according to the patient eGFR 
(15). Agreement between the pharmacists and the alert system was assessed using Cohen’s 
Kappa coefficient. Its values range from -1 to 1 and the closer the coefficient to one, the higher 
the level of agreement between the alert system and the pharmacists. 
At the end of this step, a senior pharmacist analyzed all discordances between the alert system 
and the pharmacists and rated the potential severity of each drug prescription identified as 
erroneous by the alert system or by the pharmacists according to a three-category scale used 
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in other publications (16): none; purely preventive; and serious or significant and life-
threatening. The same senior pharmacist analyzed a random sample of concordant medication 
orders to estimate the concordance rate of alerts fired by the alert system and the 
pharmacists.  
4. Results 
A total of 3228 patients were included in the study, and six pharmacists were involved (three 
seniors and three residents). The number of prescriptions analyzed per pharmacist during the 
study was 903 (median IQR [368-1132]). 
During the study period, 29 log files were generated by the alert system. These files included 
8251 drug prescription lines, including 1148 (13.91%) with no specified dose because they 
were ‘conditional’ prescription lines, and 2097 (25.42%) were not analyzed by a pharmacist 
because of understaffing; these prescription lines were excluded from the subsequent 
analyses. In fine, 5006 (60.67%) drug prescription lines had both pharmacist and alert system 
recommendations (Figure 1), involving 27 different medications (Table I). 
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Figure 1: study flowchart showing the number of drug prescription lines included/excluded from the 
study. 
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Table I: Frequency of alerts fired by the alert system and the pharmacists 
 Alert system Pharmacists 
  number of 
prescription 
lines  
Max daily dose 
alerts frequency 
Under-dose 
alerts frequency 
Max daily dose 
alerts frequency 
Under-dose 
alerts frequency 
Allopurinol 309 49 (15.86%) 2 (0.65%) 6 (1.94%) 0 (0.00%) 
Amikacin 21 9 (42.86%) 2 (9.52%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 
Amorolfine1 2 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 
Amoxicillin 310 8 (2.58%) 1 (0.32%) 1 (0.32%) 0 (0.00%) 
Amoxicillin and potassium 
clavulanate  
440 69 (15.68%) 5 (1.14%) 2 (0.45%) 0 (0.00%) 
Atenolol  303 5 (1.65%) 8 (2.64%) 3 (1%) 0 (0.00%) 
Bisoprolol 508 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 
Captopril 25 0 (0.00%) 7 (28.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 
Cefotaxim 355 2 (0.56%) 10 (2.82%) 1 (0.28%) 1 (0.28%) 
Ciprofloxacin  99 2 (2.02%) 2 (2.02%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 
Erythromycin 3 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 
Ethambutol 35 7 (20.00%) 1 (2.86%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 
Fosfomycin 1 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 
Gentamicin 56 30 (53.57%) 6 (10.71%) 3 (5.36%) 0 (0.00%) 
Isoniazid 38 0 (0.00%) 34 (89.47%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 
Levofloxacin 230 12 (5.22%) 3 (1.30%) 4 (1.74%) 0 (0.00%) 
Metformin 387 69 (17.83%) 5 (1.29%) 10 (2.58%) 0 (0.00%) 
                                                          
1
 Paraffin-Vaseline and Amorolfine were not in the targeted medications listed in (Table I); however, prescription lines of these medications were reported in the log file by the alert system. The explanation lies in the 
implementation of the data access layer of the alert system. This layer allows querying the CPOE/EHR database to gather the data that should be checked by the clinical decision rules. In this SQL query, we 
inadvertently added Paraffine-Vaseline and Amorolfine as targeted medication to be checked by the alert system.  
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Metronidazole 99 3 (3.03%) 0 (0.00%) 1 (%) 0 (0.00%) 
Norfloxacin 19 1 (5.26%) 9 (47.37%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 
Paraffin, Vaseline2 110 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 
Ramipril 1148 6 (0.52%) 16 (1.39%) 1 (0.09%) 1 (0.09%) 
Sulfamethoxazole, Trimethoprim 256 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 
Tramadol 82 6 (7.32%) 2 (2.44%) 1 (1.22%) 0 (0.00%) 
Tobramycin 2 0 (0.00%) 2 (100.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 
Valaciclovir 93 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 
Vancomycin 62 5 (8.06%)  23 (37.10%) 1 (1.61%) 1 (1.61%) 
  5006 283 (5.56%) 138 (2.76%) 34 (0.68%) 3 (0.06%) 
                                                          
2
 Paraffin-Vaseline and Amorolfine were not in the targeted medications listed in (Table I); however, prescription lines of these medications were reported in the log file by the alert system. The explanation lies in the 
implementation of the data access layer of the alert system. This layer allows querying the CPOE/EHR database to gather the data that should be checked by the clinical decision rules. In this SQL query, we 
inadvertently added Paraffine-Vaseline and Amorolfine as targeted medication to be checked by the alert system. 
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Alert system performance indicators, comparison with pharmacists’ daily analysis of medication 
orders 
The alert system fired alerts for 8.41% (421/5006) of the lines, including 5.65% (283/5006) “exceeds 
max daily dose” alerts and 2.76% (138/5006) “under-dose” alerts (Table 1).  Prescriptions of 
gentamicin had the highest frequency of exceeds max daily dose alerts fired (53.57%) and 
prescriptions of isoniazid had the highest frequency of under-dose alerts (89.47%).  The alert system 
did not fire any alert for the prescription lines of seven medications:  Amorolfine, Bisoprolol, 
Erythromycin, Fosfomycin, Paraffin-Vaseline, Sulfamethoxazole-Trimethoprim, and Valaciclovir. 
Paraffin-Vaseline and Amorolfine were not in the targeted medications listed in (Table I); however, 
prescription lines of these medications were reported in the log file by the alert system (Table I).  
The pharmacists fired alerts for 0.74% (37/5006) lines; including 0.68% (34/5006) exceeds max daily 
dose alerts and 0.06% (3/5006) under-dose alerts (Table I).   Prescriptions of metformin had the 
highest frequency of exceeds max daily dose alerts (2.58%). Pharmacists didn’t fire any alerts for 14 
medications: Amikacin, Amorolfine, Bisoprolol, Captopril, Ciprofloxacin, Erythromycin, Ethambutol, 
Fosfomycin, Isoniazid, Norfloxacin, Sulfamethoxazole, Trimethoprim, Tobramycin, and Valaciclovir. 
The alert system and the pharmacists were concordant in the analysis of 4602 (91.93%) prescription 
lines: 4575 (91.39%) were accepted prescription lines and 27 (0.54%) were the subject of an alert (25 
exceeds max daily dose alerts and two under-dose alerts). The alert system and the pharmacists 
were discordant for 404 (8.07%) prescription lines (Table II). 
Kappa coefficient was of 0.106 (CI 95% [0.068 – 0.144]), and thus the agreement between the alert 
system analysis and the pharmacists’ analysis is scored as poor (Table II).  
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Table II: Alert system performance indicators, comparison with the pharmacists’ daily analysis of the 
medication orders 
  Group of pharmacists  
 Alerts Fired Not fired Total  
The alert system Fired 27 394 421 
Not 
fired 
10 4575 4585 
 Total  37 4969 5006 
 
Analysis of cases of concordance between the alert system and the pharmacists 
A senior pharmacist analyzed a random sample of 100 concordant medication orders that is orders 
for which the pharmacists and the alert system gave the same results. No errors in the checking of 
these medication orders was identified by the senior pharmacist.  
Analysis of discordance between medication order checks by the alert system and the pharmacists  
Analysis of discordances between the alert system and the group of pharmacists by a senior 
pharmacist identified three types of discordance (Table III): A- The alert system did not fire an alert 
and the pharmacists reported an error; B- The alert system fired an over dose alert and the 
pharmacists do not report an error; C- The alert system fired an under dose alert and the pharmacists 
do not report an error.   
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Type of discordance Number of prescription 
lines 
(N = L + P) 
Senior pharmacist analysis 
Agrees with the alert system advice (L) Agrees with the pharmacist advice (P) 
A- The alert system did not fire an alert 
and the pharmacists reported an error 
N=10 L=1 
- For 1 drug prescription line, the 
pharmacists failed to detect an over dose 
error 
P=9 
- For 5 drug prescription lines, the clinical decision 
rule was wrong  
- For 1, the duration of medication was too long 
and the alert system failed to detect this error 
- For 3, the alert system failed to detect additional 
prescription lines of the same medication  
B- The alert system fired an over-dose 
alert and the pharmacist did not report an 
error 
N= 258 L= 201 
- For 146: the  pharmacist failed to detect an 
over dose associated with an altered eGFR 
rate  
- For 26: the pharmacist failed to detect an 
over dose associated with an eGFR rate on 
the borderline of that authorized  
- For 29: the pharmacist failed to detect an 
over dose with a normal eGFR rate  
 
P= 57 
- For 3: the alert system failed to detect that the 
dose was adapted to the residual plasma 
concentration 
- For 45: the alert system failed to detect the 
weight of the patient 
- For 9: the alert system failed to detect a drug 
prescription not adapted to the patient blood 
pressure. 
C- The alert system fired an under dose 
alert and the pharmacist does not report 
an error  
N= 136 L= 59 
- For 3: the pharmacist failed to detect an 
under dose with an eGFR rate on the 
borderline of that authorized 
- For 21: the pharmacist failed to detect an 
under dose with an altered eGFR  
- For 35: the pharmacist failed to detect an 
under dose with a normal eGFR rate  
P=77 
- For 14: the alert system failed to detect that the 
dose was adapted to the residual plasmatic 
concentration 
- For 12: the alert system failed to detect the 
weight of the patient 
- For 6: the alert system failed to detect that the 
dose was not adapted to the patients’ blood 
pressure. 
- For 45: the alert system failed to detect that more 
than one prescription line involved the same 
medication 
 
Total  404 261 143 
Table III: Discordance cases between medication orders checked by the alert system and the pharmacists analyzed by a senior pharmacist
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The senior pharmacist was in agreement with the alert system advice for 261 of the 404 cases of 
discordance and with the pharmacists in 143 cases (Table III).  
For the 5006 drug prescription lines analyzed (Figure 1), the alert system correctly analyzed 4863 
(97.14%) whereas the pharmacists in their daily analysis of these same drug prescription lines 
correctly analyzed 4745 (94.77%).  
According to the senior pharmacist review, the alert system fired 287 true positive alerts, 134 false 
positives alerts and failed to fire the appropriate alert for nine drug prescription lines (false 
negatives) (Table IV). The pharmacists fired 36 true positive alerts, one false positive alert and failed 
to fire the appropriate alert for 260 drug prescription lines (false negatives) (Table III). False negatives 
cases for both, alert system and pharmacists were rated on our severity scale as without risk or 
purely preventive.  
Table IV: Alert system performance indicators, results after a senior pharmacist review of the cases 
of discordance  
 
  Senior pharmacist  
 Alerts Fired Not fired Total  
The alert system Fired 287  134  421 
Not 
fired 
9  4576 4585 
 Total  296 4710 5006 
 
 
Impact on clinical decision rules 
 
Table V describes the clinical decision rules that need to be refined according to the comments of the 
senior pharmacist.  
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Table V: Clinical decision rules improvements derived according to the senior pharmacist comments and the number of clinical decision rules impacted 
  
improvements according to the senior pharmacist comments 
  Number of rules per 
medication 
eGFR rate wrongly 
configured 
Blood pressure not 
configured 
Plasma concentration not 
configured 
Duration of treatment not configured 
Amikacin 72 (7,48%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 72 (7,48%) 0 (0,00%) 
Atenolol 30 (3,12%) 3 (0,31%) 30 (3,12%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 
Ethambutol 30 (3,12%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 
Metronidazol 24 (2,49%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 24 (2,49%) 
Gentamicin 40 (4,16%) 1 (0,10%) 0 (0,00%) 40 (4,16%) 40 (4,16%) 
Tramadol 16 (1,66%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 
Norfloxacin 12 (1,25%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 12 (1,25%) 
Isoniazid 30 (3,12%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 30 (3,12%) 
Metformin 18 (1,87%) 1 (0,10%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 
tobramycin 56 (5,82%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 56 (5,82%) 56 (5,82%) 
Ramipril 36 (3,74%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 
vancomicin 36 (3,74%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 36 (3,74%) 36 (3,74%) 
Aciclovir 40 (4,16%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 
Allopurinol 60 (6,24%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 
Amoxicillin 64 (6,65%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 
amoxicillin and 
potassium clavulanate 
136 (14,14%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 
Bisoprolol 34 (3,53%) 0 (0,00%) 34 (3,53%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 
Cefotaxim 32 (3,33%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 
ciprofloxacin 42 (4,37%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 
Erythrocine 18 (1,87%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 
fosfomycine 10 (1,04%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 
levofloxacin 24 (2,49%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 24 (2,49%) 
Captopril 38 (3,95%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 
sulfamethoxazole and 
trimethoprime 
24 (2,49%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 24 (2,49%) 
Valaciclovir 40 (4,16%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 0 (0,00%) 40 (4,16%) 
  962 (100,00%) 5 (0,52%) 64 (6,65%) 204 (21,21%) 286 (29,73%) 
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The initial specifications developed in collaboration with the pharmacists included the 
implementation of 962 rules. Only five (0.52%) of these rules did not fulfill the expected 
requirements because of incorrect configuration of the eGFR threshold (Table V). The other cases are 
related to various issues and can be used for improvements as discussed in the following section. 
5. Discussion 
We implemented a rule-based clinical decision alert system to support drug dosing prescription 
adjustment. We compared its performance over seven months with routine daily medication order 
analysis by several pharmacists trained to this task. The alert system and the pharmacists showed a 
relatively poor inter-rater agreement; the alert system fired more appropriate alerts than the 
pharmacists and made fewer errors than pharmacists in analyzing drug dose prescriptions: 143 errors 
for the alert system versus 261 for the pharmacists. Most of diagnostic errors made by the 
pharmacists, but not the alert system, were ‘false negative’, i.e. errors not detected by the 
pharmacists corresponded to drug prescription lines with an exceeded maximum daily dose or under 
dosing. This is important in routine clinical practice because it is important that the system detects all 
potential errors. In addition, during the study period, the pharmacists were not able to analyze a 
significant number of drug prescription lines, 2097 (25.42%), because of understaffing; this issue 
obviously does not affect the alert system (Pharmacist’s workload issue can be also addressed by 
adapting the alert system to the prescriber physicians). The alert system failed to fire an alert for 
nine drug prescription lines (table 3); these cases are discussed in the following as potential alert 
system improvements.  
The design of a system based on clinical decision rules involves three main steps: creation or 
developing the rules; testing and validating the rules; and finally, analyzing the effects of the rules on 
clinician behavior or patient outcome (17). This study represents the second of these steps for a set 
of clinical decision rules designed and developed at the HEGP since 2008 (10)(11). In this set of rules, 
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only five (0.52%) rules did not fulfill the expected requirements (Table V). We are convinced that this 
small number of “wrong” rules is related to the use of an “in-silico” retrospective testing process 
(15). This design step (15) allows to established a ‘partial’ external validity of these rules. The study 
we report here completes the validation of these rules. The next step is thus an impact analysis 
study. 
The last step of our method was the expert senior pharmacist review of both CDSS alert 
interventions and the pharmacist’s interventions. Post expert reviews of CDSS alerts response have 
already been used in other studies to validate clinical alerts (18)(19)(20). McCoy et al. (20) proposed 
a framework based on experts reviews to judge clinical alerts appropriateness. Despite the fact that 
the senior expert review was done in optimum conditions by comparison with the daily pharmacist’s 
analysis of medication orders; a limitation in the method we report here was the use of only one 
expert review.  
According to the analysis of the senior pharmacist (table V), three important improvements related 
to the clinical decision rules should be considered: 
 The first group concerns rules for which clinical conditions are missing. Clinical decision rules 
that check orders of: atenolol, bisoprolol, captopril and ramipril, should be configured to 
include the blood pressure levels at time of ordering as a parameter. On the initiation of 
treatment, the drug doses should be adapted to the patient eGFR. Subsequently, however, 
drug doses should be adapted to the clinical response, in this case, according to the blood 
pressure. Even if the initial drug dosage prescribed respects the eGFR adaptation rules, the 
subsequent dose adjustment should be based on patient clinical response such as orthostatic 
hypotension or persistence of high blood pressure.  
 The second group concerns clinical decision rules for which duration of treatment and/or 
cumulative dosage are of importance. Clinical decision rules that check orders of: antibiotics 
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(amikacin, metronidazole, gentamicin, norfloxacin, isoniazid, tobramycin, vancomycin, 
levofloxacin, sulfamethoxazole/trimethoprim and valaciclovir), should be configured to 
include the duration of treatment as a parameter. Indeed, drug prescription of antibiotics 
agents for a long period of treatment can lead to the emergence of resistance. 
Recommendations of treatment duration of anti-infectious agents depend on the type of 
infectious disease that has be diagnosed. For example, for Levofloxacin, the treatment 
duration should be of 7 days in the case of cystitis and 3 to 6 weeks in the case of a 
prostatitis. 
 The third group concerns clinical decision rules for which individual response and plasma 
concentration measurements can be required. Clinical decision rules that check orders of: 
amikacin, gentamicin, tobramycin, vancomycin, valaciclovir and digoxin should be configured 
to include the plasma concentration as a parameter on which alerts may be based. For 
example: after 24 hours of a first prescription of Amikacin to a patient, even if the drug dose 
is adapted to the patient eGFR, the patient residual plasma concentration should be checked 
and should be lower than or equal to 4 mg/L. 
Several of the reasons that led to the failure of the alert system were associated with the uncertainty 
of medical knowledge. Uncertainty in handling medical knowledge can be of several types (21):  
 Lack of information: the data necessary to fire an alert are not always available, or may be 
available but unreliable, or not sufficiently structured to be processed by an electronic 
device. This was the case for drug prescription lines where the weight of the patient was not 
available or was only reported in a Word file attached to the patient EHR. 
 Fuzziness in determination of which clinical data fire an alert: this was the case for drug 
prescription lines where alerts were fired because of the patient eGFR rate but the senior 
pharmacist indicated that the dose was, appropriately, adapted to the residual plasmatic 
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concentration or to the patient blood pressure or to the treatment duration, and not to the 
eGFR of the patient. 
 Vagueness in the formulation of certain recommendations on which we based the 
implementation of some of the clinical decision rules: the exact meaning of “the expert panel 
prefer…” or “…in such cases kalemia must be checked closely”, for example, is unclear. 
Issues related to the lack of structured data can be partially covered by NLP tools. Different 
architectures can be implemented: NLP systems can be integrated within the alert system or coupled 
with it to various degrees of agility; NLP systems can be governed by the alert system or implement 
knowledge and logic necessary to support decisions; some NLP systems have been developed for 
specific tasks or alternatively, a generalized tool can  be customized for particular tasks (22).  
Issues related to the vagueness of clinical knowledge can be approached by extending the system to 
fuzzy logic. There are few examples of the practical application of this technique in clinical decision 
support (23); it is nevertheless a very promising avenue of research for optimizing our clinical 
decision rules-based alert system (24). 
The alert system fired 287 appropriate alerts, these alerts were rated by the senior pharmacist as 
without risk or purely preventive according to our severity scale. Even if the senior pharmacist judged 
that firing these alerts was necessary, we think that in order to avoid the alert fatigue syndrome in 
daily practice, alerts without risk or purely preventive alerts should be implemented in non-
interruptive mode and targeted both towards the physicians and the pharmacists. Alerts related to 
contraindications will be implemented in interruptive mode (25). Both interruptive and non-
interruptive alerts can be useful in daily clinical practice (26), although there is some difficulty in 
determining the threshold between a non-interruptive alert and an interruptive alert. More tests 
should be performed using our approach reported in (15) to define the different parameters (the 
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drug dosage, the patient eGFR,…) and the values of each parameters which can switch an alert from 
an non-interruptive mode to an interruptive mode. 
Discrepancies between pharmacists in daily medication orders analysis may partly explain the low 
concordance rate between the group of pharmacists and the alert system. Checklists seem to be a 
key instrument to reduce individual variations between staff members doing the same tasks, to 
reduce human error and ensure that quality standards are maintained (27)(28). For pharmaceutical 
analysis of drug orders, checklists could be a list of clinical action items related to one or several 
clinical parameters arranged in a systematic and easy manner allowing the pharmacist to remember 
and / or to record the presence / absence of each item listed and to ensure that all have been 
checked.  This checklist should be integrated into the CPOE/EMR system in order to be used by 
pharmacists during their daily analysis of drug orders (29).   
 
Conclusion 
We have been investigating individual variation between pharmacists analyzing physician medication 
orders. We observed that more severe the renal function impairment was associated with a greater 
number of unsatisfactory drug prescription lines in medication orders and with a better pharmacist 
analysis of that type of medication order. In other words, the pharmacists’ diagnostic performance 
was better for more dangerous medication orders than for less dangerous orders (manuscript in 
preparation). These results and the results of the study we report here reinforce our conviction that 
the computerized alert system is complementary to pharmacists for their contributions to drug 
prescription safety. Knowing that a large number of drug prescription lines are not been analyzed by 
pharmacists because of understaffing, using the alert system with a non-interruptive mode for some 
alerts could relieve pharmacists of some of the routine work. Consequently, they could focus on 
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detecting more ‘dangerous’ medication orders that would have passed the first barrier of focused 
physicians’ targeted alerts and thereby enhance the safety of the process of drug prescription.   
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